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BEWARE IMOs:
THE FUTURE OF HMO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LIABILITY IS UNCERTAIN
Neville A. Bilimzoria"
The face of health maintenance organization (HMO) delivery is in the
process of dramatic change. IMOs, organizations that control costs and
utilization of health care services through requiring prepayment by
subscribers for services,' are growing in the United States.2 The challenge
for IMOs continues to be controlling costs and increasing access to health
care while maintaining the quality of services provided? Recent reports
indicate some HMOs in the northeastern part of the country have begun
to experience increased costs and are increasing the premiums they
charge. More importantly, IMOs across the nation are beginning to feel
the pressures of tort reform and other state laws which counter the IMOs'
drive to reduce health care expenditures.
This article examines both HMOs' success in defending malpractice
claims and the recent laws making IMOs more susceptible to malpractice
lawsuits.4 The article also analyzes possible strategies for HIMOs to
defend future malpractice suits. Section I will discuss the rise and current
status of IMOs in the United States. Section II describes current H1MG
medical malpractice claims. In Section III, ERISA preemption of state
H-MO medical malpractice claims is examined. Section IV discusses the
trend away from general immunity for IMOs, historically provided by
ERISA. Finally, Section V will outline strategies that will permit HMOs
to reduce the risk of liability.
"Associate, Holleb & Coff, Chicago, IL. B.A., Northwestern University, 1991; 1D.,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1994.
'Barbara Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liabli4y Adapt to the
Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1997).
'Ellyn Spragins, Does Your HMO Stack Up?, NEWSWTEK, June 24, 1996, at 56 (graphic
showing enrollment in HMOs grew from six million in 1976 to 53.3 million in 1995).
'Noah, supra note 1, at 1220-21.4Milt Freudenheim, Baby Boomers Force AlewRulesfor HMOs, N.Y. TE.M, Nov. 27, 1997,
at Al ("[m]ore than 1,000 managed-care bills were introduced in state legislatures last year.
Congress also enacted new requirements. These laws, called mandates, limit the ability of
H.M.O.s to contain costs .... ")
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THE CURRENT STATE OF HMOs
Today there are over 65 million HMO members nationwide.5 There are
roughly 90 million other Americans enrolled in similar managed care
organizations, such as preferred provider organizations 0(POs.)6 While
many criticize IIMOs due to their bureaucracy and cost cutting
incentives,7 HMOs remain established institutions.
The impetus behind the proliferation of HMOs in the United States
was the growth in health care expenditures compared with other countries.
See Figure 1.8
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'Michael Higgins, Increased Exposure to HMOs, 83 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (Sept. 1997).
6Noah, supra note 1, at 1220.
'See Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners: Health Care Delivery and Its
Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIZ. L. RFV. 399, 411 (1996) ("[t]he incentive structure
created is for the [HMO] to use fewer resources per patient as a means of realizing a greater profit
... [W]hen physicians are pressured into underutilization, there is a danger that the quality of care
provided will fall below the legally required standard.").
8Aki Yoshikawa et al., How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals in a Universal
Health Care System, 3 STAN. L. & PO.'Y REV. 111, 115 (1991).
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In fact, President Bill Clinton, one of the more ardent supporters of
HMOs, has viewed the managed care organization as an efficient way to
reduce the spiraling costs of health care in the United States.
9
Undoubtedly, managed care organizations use cost cutting methods
to stave off the enormous expenditures on health care. As a consequence,
HMOs make decisions affecting the quality of care. It can be argued that
IMOs are needed to avoid disastrous economic consequences; 10 however,
efforts need to be taken to ensure HMO quality while allowing appropriate
profits through cost cutting incentives. Unfortunately, the objective of
reducing health care costs while increasing access to health care has thus
far been unattainable.
Given the need for HMOs and the lack of alternatives, it is important
to observe that the tension between quality and cost cutting is only
minimally addressed by the legal system. Courts are now increasingly
allowing medical malpractice suits against HMOs which will undoubtedly
lead to large financial setbacks for even the most stable HMOs.
HMO LIABILITY
HMOs are currently held liable for actions of doctors and nurses through
the theory of "enterprise liability." This theory encompasses vicarious
liability and actual or apparent agency theories against HMOs, much like
the law applied in medical malpractice litigation against hospitals. These
theories would result in HMO liability for the actions of provider
physicians under their health plan.
9Susan Garland, Managed Care: Dr. Clinton Has Grim Neivs, BUS. WL-, Jan. 18, 1993, at
35. In 1992, the nation spent S838.5 billion on health care. Health care experes in 1992
amounted to 14 percent of the Gross National Product, up from 9.1 percent in 1931. Id.
Government spending on health care was a significant part of Clinton's health care reform
campaign, which is largely responsible for the change to managed care organizations, like HMO3,
today. Said Clinton, health care unreformed "is going to bankrupt the country."Say .argh For
Reform, ECONOmsT, Feb. 6, 1993, at 25.
Journalists agreed that health care reform was needed and HMOs became the answer: "The
problem with hospital costs is not simply that they are high, but that they have been rising rapidly
and consuming an ever larger fraction of gross national product." W.B. Schwartz, The Inevitable
Failure of Current Cost-Containment Strategies, 257 JAMA 220,220 (1987).
"°Health Care Prognosis, BUS. WVK., April 7, 1997, at 3 (graphic depicting that by year
2005, national health care expenditures will constitute nearly 18 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product even with slower growth).
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Under the state law theories, LMO liability may be established by
evidence of any of the following:
(1) that a patient was restricted to selecting a primary care physician
(PCP) through an HMO-provider list;
(2) that patients under the HMO were treated by a specialist only after the
negligently delayed referral (approval) of the selected PCP; or
(3) that the selected PCP was screened by the HMO through a defective
credentialling process."
In addition, IMO liability may be established through direct
evidence contained within the HMOs' brochures which list physicians as
being competent and pre-screened for periods of time before being
selected for the health plan. The negligent credentialling claim is further
bolstered when an HMO limits the choice of physicians. In all, these
claims may likely be proven in light of the economically motivated
procedures of the HMO, including granting financial incentives to PCPs
for discouraging referrals and using less costly treatments.1
2
Recently, a Pennsylvania Court held the failure of HMOs to refer a
young patient to a specialist in a timely manner, which ultimately lead to
the patient's hearing loss, was enough to support a medical malpractice
claim against the actual HIMO.' 3 This decision is particularly troubling for
HMOs as they enter an era of ever increasing access to enrollment, which
in turn, necessarily increases bureaucracy and the time for approval of
referrals.
State law actions for breach of contract or breach of implied warranty
are also possible claims against HMOs for injuries involving
malpractice.' 4 However, whether direct negligence, enterprise liability, or
breach of contract, many HMOs today can take advantage of defenses
provided by federal statutory law.
"Allen D. Allred & Karen A. Carr, Enterprise Liability Puts MCOs at Risk, NAT'L L. J.,
Sept. 8, 1997, atB9.
121d.
"Fitzgerald v. Mercy Catholic Medical Ctr., No. 02983 PHL 96, Pa. Super.
'
4See, e.g., Raglin v. HMO Illinois, 230 Ill. App. 3d 642, 595 N.E.2d 153 (1992).
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HMOs and ERISA PREEMPTION
The medical malpractice liability of HMOs is largely limited through
immunity provided by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).15 Congress enacted ERISA to provide a unified regulation
of employee benefit plans. Generally, ERISA supersedes all state laws
relating to employee benefit plans. For example, HMO coverage, as part
of an employee benefit plan, would be covered under ERISA. The United
States Supreme Court has given ERISA a very broad preemption
interpretation 16 and thus, HMOs often avail themselves of immunity from
state law claims for medical malpractice merely by asserting ERISA
preemption. While currently viable, this ERISA immunity defense has
been increasingly susceptible to erosion.
While ERISA provides two methods for preemption which are
discussed below, attorneys must note ERISA preemption only applies to
qualified health plans subject to ERISA. Therefore, HMOs not provided
through an enrollee's employment are not able to utilize ERISA
preemption as a defense. However, it is notable that most MO enrollees
(about 65 percent) are members as part of an employment benefit plan.
Section 502(a) Complete Preemption
Preemption under Sec. 502(a)1 7 of ERISA is referred to as "complete pre-
emption" '8 and involves the federal court's removal jurisdiction. If a state
law claim can be characterized as within the scope of ERISA's § 502(a)
civil enforcement provisions, the state law claim is completely preempted
and the federal court will retain jurisdiction.
Specifically, ERISA Sec. 502(a) provides a civil enforcement action
can be brought for the following three reasons only:
(1) to recover benefits due in a plan;
(2) to enforce fights under a plan; or
(3) to clarify rights to future benefits under a plan.19
'-529 U.S.C.A. § 1001 - 1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
6See, ag.,District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
729 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
"Thomas A. Moore and Matthew Gaier, HMO Liabilio, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 2, 1997.
9Schmid v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 943-44 (D. Or. 1997).
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If a state law claim falls within the scope of the Sec. 502(a) enforcement
actions, the claim is recharacterized as a "federal claim" under ERISA,
thus resulting in federal subject matter jurisdiction.
As a result of the operation of Sec. 502(a), plaintiffs are able to
enforce rights under the terms of ERISA with the necessary extinguishing
of all state law claims. In reality, plaintiffs are not truly preempted
because they are allowed to recover only equitable relief through Sec.
502(a). However, See. 502(a) effectively limits damages a plan participant
can recover. Therefore, if a plaintiffs malpractice claim against an HMO
is categorized under Sec. 502(a), her suit is essentially preempted,
allowing only equitable recovery such as for benefits denied (i.e., cost of
a denied hospital stay). Plaintiffs can sue for the cost of the treatment
denied by the HMO, but are unable to collect damages for health problems
resulting from not receiving the treatment. 0 State law negligence theories
would therefore yield no damages to the plaintiff if "complete
preemption" was found.2
Section 514(a) Conflict Preemption
Any state claim not falling within the purview of the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA may, nonetheless, be preempted by a second form
of ERISA preemption under Sec. 514(a),22 known as "conflict pre-
emption." Therefore, -MOs may have this second line of defense to
malpractice claims under ERISA if complete preemption does not apply.
Under conflict preemption, ERISA supersedes state laws which
"relate to" an ERISA plan.23 In the case of conflict preemption, it is
important to ask whether the state law claim "has a connection with or
reference to" the ERISA plan, namely the HMO plan.24 Not all state laws
are necessarily preempted, but the Supreme Court has directed courts to
apply ERISA's preemption clause expansively.2 In fact, courts must
determine on a case by case basis whether the state medical malpractice
law claims asserted by the plaintiff against an HMO "affect employee
2 Higgins, supra note 5, at 24.
2 id. See James Walker Smith and Christopher P. Hannan, ERISA Preemption, MED. MALP.
L. & STRATEGY (March 1997).
2'29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985 & Supp 1997).
23Id
24Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
25See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
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benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or a peripheral manner" to find that
the state law does not "relate to" the plan.26
Unlike complete preemption, conflict preemption under Sec. 514(a)
does not create federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, if a state
malpractice claim against an LIMO is not found under complete
preemption, the case must be remanded to state court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.27 Consequently, the state law claims will sunive in
state court, but the IMO wil still have Sec. 514(a) conflict preemption
available as a defense rather than as a basis for federal jurisdiction.
Commentators and case law show that when cases are remanded to state
courts (when complete preemption cannot be shown), even though conflict
preemption may be an available I-MO defense, state courts are disinclined
to offer immunity to HMOs based on See. 514(a).23 It is clear that conflict
preemption is broader than complete preemption because state law claims
found under Sec. 502(a) are necessarily preempted by See. 514(a), as
necessarily "relat[ing] to" the health plan. Conversely, state laws that do
not fall within complete preemption may fall under conflict preemption
for use by IMOs as a defense to medical malpractice liability.
CURRENT TRENDS IN HM1O LIABILITY
While state and other federal courts are struggling over the applicability
and breadth of ERISA preemption clauses, some states are opening the
door for medical malpractice suits against LMOs. Recent trends show the
case law is eroding the ERISA preemption for IMOs and newly enacted
laws are increasingly accepting of enterprise liability.
Split in the Circuits
IMOs may find relief in the holdings of two recent decisions of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Rice v. Panchal,9 the Seventh
Circuit found no complete preemption attached to a claim that would hold
an IMO liable under a theory of vicarious liability for the actual or
26Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
27Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (76 Cir. 1995).
28See, e.g., Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). Sce Smith & Hannan,
supra note 21.
29Rice,65 F.3d 637 (7T Cir. 1995).
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apparent agent physician's malpractice. 3 The court in Rice held the state
law claims of respondeat superior could be decided without the
interpretation of an ERISA plan, and therefore, were not subject to
preemption. 3' According to Rice, only the tenuous conflict preemption
defense could be asserted in state court.
More recently in Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan,3' however, the
Seventh Circuit revisited complete preemption for HMO malpractice
liability. In Jass, plaintiff sued the IMO and an HMO-employed nurse
for the nurse's determination that the plaintiff be discharged after knee
surgery without the necessary rehabilitation.33 The plaintiff also sued the
physician who discharged her from the hospital claiming the HIMO was
vicariously liable for his malpractice.34  In effect, Jass ruled direct
negligence on the part of the HMO (through the nurse) was actually a
claim for a denial of benefits, thus effectively preempted by Sec. 502(a).35
The Jass court retained federal jurisdiction based on diversity, and
therefore, the Seventh Circuit was able to rule on the vicarious liability
count against the HMO for the physician's negligence.36 Jass held the
vicarious liability claim was also preempted, but this time under Sec. 514
because the plan was the basis of the relationship between HMO and the
physician.37 Because the plan would need to be examined to determine
whether there was vicarious liability, the state law claim was preempted.
While the Seventh Circuit appears to provide ERISA preemption to
state law claims alleging direct negligence against HMOs, other circuits
are not as accommodating to preemption arguments. In Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare,39 plaintiffs sued for injuries resulting from medical
malpractice of HMO affiliated hospitals and physiciansi4 The Third
Circuit ruled such state claims of direct negligence, Le., negligent hiring
"
01d. at 646.
3
"Id. at 645.
'
2Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482 (7"' Cir. 1996).
33Id. at 1485.
34Id.
35Id. at 1489 (stating plaintiffs claim against the nurse was really a "ji 502(a) denial of
benefits claim").
'6Id. at 1491-92.
37Jass 88 F.3d at 1493.
31See id. at 1492-95.
3'Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).40Od. at 351.
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by an HMO, are not completely preempted under Sec. 502(a) of ERSA'
Dukes reasoned that the complaint did not allege denial of benefits against
the HIO, but rather asserted a claim for negligent care.4" The Third
Circuit drew a distinction between claims that focused on the "quantity"
of benefits, which would be preempted, and claims that focused on the
"quality" of benefits, which would not.43 Dukes ruled Sec. 502(a) was not
intended to control the quality of benefits received by plan participants,
allowing for state law claims of medical malpractice against an IIMO. 4
The Third and Seventh Circuits are at apparent odds with each other
regarding applicability of complete preemption to medical malpractice
claims against HMOs. Unfortunately for HMOs, the Tenth Circuit in
Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Bur-age4 held an action holding an HMO
vicariously liable for malpractice of one of its physicians does not relate
to the plan and does not entail conflict preemption under See. 514(a)4
Seemingly in conflict with the Seventh Circuit in Jass, the Tenth Circuit
court in Pacificare ruled state law claims holding an HMO potentially
liable for a judgment, while carrying a potential economic impact, "is not
enough to relate the action to the plan." 7 More dangerous for HMOs was
the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, which if adopted, could prove the end
of ERISA preemption:
Just as ERISA does not preempt the malpractice claim
against the doctor, it should not preempt the vicarious liability
claim against the HMO if the HMO has held out the doctor as its
agent .... We agree with the district court that reference to the plan
to resolve the agency issue does not implicate the concerns of
ERISA preemption.41
Indeed the difference in reasoning behind the opinions in Jass, Rice,
Dukes, and Pacificare indicates that "reasonable capable people may
411d. at 351-52.421d. at 357.
431d.
44Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.45Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
46Id. at 155.
47Id. at 154 (quoting Airports Co. v. Custom Benefits Services of Austin, Inc., 23 F.3d 1062,
1065 (106 Cir. 1994)).
4"Pacificare 59 F.3d at 155.
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differ" as to the proper analysis regarding ERISA preemption of HMO
medical malpractice claims.4 While the Third, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have each decided against preemption in at least one case,"° the
Seventh, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have conversely ruled in favor of
ERISA preemption for malpractice claims against HMOs. "I
The most recent ERISA preemption decision came from the Eighth
Circuit in Shea v. Esensten.52 In Shea, the court held state tort claims
against an HMO for failing to disclose that it provided incentives to deter
its physicians from making referrals were preempted under Sec. 514(a). 3
In fact, Shea followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Anderson v.
Humana54 where attacks on an HMO's incentive structure were deemed
preempted.55
United States Supreme Court Signal?
Ultimately, the issue of HMO liability and ERISA preemption will have
to be decided by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court has
indirectly hinted towards limiting ERISA preemption for HIMO liability
in the case of California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham.56 Although California Div. of Labor, addressed a California
wage law and not HMO liability, the Court's dicta appeared to signal that
ERISA preemption is limited when preemption would limit a state's rights
to control medical care quality standards. The Court seemed to side with
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pacificare finding mere economic impact
on an ERISA plan does not warrant preemption:
Indeed, if ERISA were concerned with any state aotion --
such as medical-care quality standards or hospital workplace
regulations -- that increased costs of providing certain benefits, and
49Keamey v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
"°See, e.g., Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc., v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10"' Cir. 1995); Dukes
v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
'
1See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding a wrongful death action against
an HMO based upon utilization review that hospitalization was not available wa; preempted under
Section 514(a)); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995).52Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
53Id. at 627.
54Anderson v. Humana, 24 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1994).
"SShea, 107 F.3d at 628 (citing Anderson, 24 F.3d at 891).
S6Califomia Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
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thereby potentially affected the choices made by ERISA plans, we
could scarcely see the end of ERISA's pre-emptive reach, and the
words "relate to" would limit nothing. 7
Despite Califonzia Div. of Labor, however, the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the issue of HMO liability and ERISA preemption clauses.
A Wave of State Laws
State legislatures across the country are now proactively moving to hold
IMOs liable for malpractice, even if the new laws allow consumers
greater tort protections against MOs. For example, Texas Governor,
George W. Bush signed four bills increasing consumer protections against
malpractice by HMO plans.5" Although these statutes took effect in
September 1997, a suit has already been filed seeking to enjoin officials
from enforcing the law, contending ERISA preemption.s9
Florida passed legislation similar to that of Texas last year;, however,
the bill was vetoed by the governor. Arizona and Connecticut have passed
statutes offering consumers the right to appeal HMO decisions to review
boards. A Missouri statute attempts to remove HMOs exemption from
liability for medical malpractice.60 With this flood of state legislation, the
Supreme Court will undoubtedly have to decide whether to extend ERISA
preemption broadly against state HMO medical malpractice status.
STRATEGIES FOR HMOs
Until the Supreme Court decides ERISA preemption and HMO liability,
HMOs can follow a few guidelines in defense of HMO malpractice
claims. First, an HMO should try to characterize the state law claim, no
57Id. at 840.
S8See TEx. CIV. PRAC. & RI. CODE ANN. § SS.001 -8S.003 (Vecst 1997 & Supp. 1998)
(section 88.002 of the statute provides that HMOs have the duty to exercise ordinary care when
making treatment decisions and are liable for damages caused by failure to exercise such ordinary
care. HiMOs are also liable for damages proximately caused by decisions made by employees,
agents, ostensible agents, or representatives acting on their behalf).
-"See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't. of Ins., H-97-2071 (D.S. Tex., filed June
16, 1997) (alleging this legislation is preempted by ERISA).
'1997 Mo. Legis. Serv. 302,313 (West) repealing Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.505(3) (deleting
"[a]ny health maintenance organization authorized under sections 354A00 to 354.550 shall not
be deemed to be practicing medicine and shall be exempt from the provisions of chapter 334 R.S.
Mo.").
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matter how artfully pleaded, as a denial of benefits claim within the scope
of Sec. 502(a) or complete preemption. The Jass decision is an excellent
reference for arguing that a plaintiffs complaint is in fact plead as a denial
of benefits.61 Of course, if complete preemption is unavailable, HMOs
should look to categorize the state malpractice claim as being otherwise
"related to" the plan under Sec. 514(a) or conflict preemption.
Furthermore, HMOs can make changes in infrastructure to combat
potential state law malpractice claims. For example, HMO employees
should be structured so that they serve only in an administrative capacity,
not in a medical capacity. The more medically involved the HMO
administrator becomes under a plan, the more likely a court will find a
state claim to be a quality of care issue, similar to Dukes, where ERISA
preemption may not apply.
62
Finally, defense counsel should strive to characterize an HMO's
actions as part of its administrative function, rather than the rendering of
medical care. Such an effort will require examining the legislative history
or longstanding case law on ERISA itself to determine applicability of
ERISA preemption to the HMO's actual administrative practices. Again,
the Seventh Circuit decision in Jass provides a good basis for such a
defense argument.63
CONCLUSION
The recent movement toward the erosion of ERISA immunity for HMOs
may result in new standards of care in medical malpractice cases against
HMOs. These standards will be determined by applicable state medical
malpractice law. Enterprise liability will likely make HMOs accountable
for most malpractice by HMO plans if ERISA preemption falls by the
wayside. Ultimately, the Supreme Court may need to resolve the conflict
between the various circuit court decisions involving HMO liability and
ERISA preemption. For now, iMOs can only follow the current laws in
their jurisdiction, with the hope that ERISA preemption is not further
eroded by the Supreme Court.
6
"Jass, at 88 F.3d at 1491 n.6.62Smith & Hannan, supra note 22.
63SeeJass, 88 F.3d at 1491.
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